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          ABSTRACT 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of Americans’ attitudes toward 
immigration. I develop a measure of general support for immigration based on individuals’ responses 
to four immigration items: (1) support for increases in (legal) immigration; (2) feeling thermometer 
scores for illegal immigrants; (3) support for spending on border security to prevent illegal 
immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal immigration” as a foreign policy goal. These items 
load on a single factor and permit us to generate a global pro-immigration scale that reflects 
Americans’ general views toward immigration. Further, I develop a comprehensive model of 
immigration attitudes that includes eight clusters of independent variables: (1) symbolic politics 
attitudes; (2) economic self interest; (3) demographic attributes; (4) feelings toward Hispanics and 
Asians, which are two groups commonly associated with immigration; (5) media effects; (6) values, 
including Americanism, moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and views about important foreign policy 
goals; (7) religion effects; and (8) state racial, ethnic, and economic context.  I find that Americans’ 
attitudes toward immigration are driven primarily by demographic attributes, feelings toward 
Hispanics and Asians, Americanism and other relevant values and views regarding foreign policy 
goals. Surprisingly, economic self interest plays almost no role in shaping immigration attitudes.  
Symbolic politics attitudes (such as political ideology and partisan identification) do not have a 
significant effect on support for immigration in the main model, yet the path model indicates that 
political ideology has a strong indirect and direct effect on immigration attitudes.  Moreover, I find 
large differences in coefficients for Latino and Asian variables, signifying that further research should 























CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is no surprise to find that the U.S. population has increased greatly from 1966 to 2006.  
Nonetheless, it is important to consider that the majority of the increase has been mostly due to a 
growing population of immigrants.  According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2006), from 1966 to 2006 
immigrants and their offspring born in the U.S. contributed to a U.S. population growth of 55 percent.  
Within this group of immigrants, Latino1 immigrants made up more than half of the addition, 53 
percent.  Furthermore, Asian and Pacific Islander immigrants and their children represented a 22 
percent increase in the U.S. population due to immigration. Clearly, the American population is being 
shaped considerably by the influx of immigrants from other countries.  
 
 In addition to shaping the population, immigrants have influenced the United States culturally, 
socially, and politically.  Population growth among Latinos has outpaced that of blacks, and Latinos 
are now the largest American minority.  The Spanish language has spread nationwide, and there are 
other areas where languages spoken by Asian immigrants are common. Throughout various ranges of 
businesses and customer service firms, business customers have been given the option to be attended to 
in either English or Spanish, and never before has this occurred with any European language.  
Furthermore, a large number of bilingual and multicultural schools have been established nationwide, 
conveying the interests of some Americans in greater knowledge of multiculturalism.   
 
 Of course, these changes have heralded in a new wave of political conflict. Americans are sharply 
divided over the issue of immigration, particularly in terms of their views toward the increase in illegal 
immigrants and how to resolve issues relating to their legal status. There is considerable variation in 
Americans’ attitudes toward legal immigration, in part stemming from variation in question wording 
(Polling Report, 2006), but overall Americans tend toward keeping legal immigration levels either the 
same or below current levels. There seems to be a general consensus among Americans that illegal 
immigration needs to be reduced, but there is disagreement about whether illegal immigrants help or 
hurt the U.S. economy, as well as over what actions should be taken to stem the flow of illegal 
immigrants into the U.S. For instance, majorities of Americans support tough action on illegal 
immigration (e.g., building a fence on the U.S.-Mexican border, fining employers who hire illegal 
immigrants), while majorities of Americans are opposed to mass deportations of illegal immigrants and 
also support a guest worker program and/or efforts to offer illegal immigrants U.S. citizenship under 
certain circumstances. Clearly, Americans are divided—and internally conflicted—over how to 
address legal and illegal immigration. 
 
 What explains variations in Americans’ views toward legal and illegal immigration?  While there 
has been some research on the topic, more remains to be done to understand the determinants of 
individual opinions about immigration, particularly in light of the high profile nature of discussions of 
immigration among elites, the media, and the mass public. In this paper I explore the determinants of 
Americans’ attitudes toward immigration. Using the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) 
and data from the U.S. Census, I plan on developing and testing a general model of public opinion 
toward immigration, focusing on how support for illegal and legal immigration fluctuates as a function 
of economic self interest, symbolic politics, demographic characteristics, evaluations and perceptions 
of Latinos and Asians, media effects, Americanism and other values, religion effects and ethnic, racial 
and economic context.  I intend on applying this model to the general population, including whites, 
                                                 
1 As is customary in most scholarly work that references people of Spanish origin, the terms “Latino” and 




blacks, Hispanics and Asians.  Towards the end of this paper, I plan on examining the relationship 
among independent variables and their effect on general support for immigration using structural 

















































CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
   
 There are few issues that have been as controversial in the United States and Western European 
countries as immigration. There is little doubt that immigration is an issue that divides most Western 
European countries, and the United States is not exempt from these debates. Some scholars have 
addressed the subject of mass attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe (e.g., Fetzer, 2000; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). Americans’ attitudes towards immigration to the U.S. have also drawn 
some attention in the scholarly literature (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Hood and Morris, 1998; 
Burns and Gimpel, 2000). Although scholars have developed and tested models that include a wide 
range of factors that are expected to shape public opinion toward immigration, there has been little 
effort to develop a comprehensive model that accounts for a wide range of variables related to 
immigration attitudes. In this section, I describe the clusters of explanatory variables that have been the 
subject of previous research on immigration attitudes. 
 
2.1 Contact and Context 
 
 One of the most interesting and controversial ideas about what influences Anglos’ attitudes 
towards immigration to the United States is contact.  Hood and Morris (1998) concentrate significant 
portions of their research on attitudes towards immigration on determining whether whites’ opinions 
regarding illegal and legal immigration are influenced by the contact that they have with immigrants, 
as well as if whites’ opinions differ based on the legal status of the immigrants with whom they are in 
contact.  These scholars define the contact as “close and increased contact with an individual of a 
certain racial group produces a more favorable response to members of that group” (Hood and Morris, 
1997; Amir, 1969, 1976; Jackman and Crane, 1980; Stephan, 1985). 
 
 Hood and Morris (1997) also examine the effects of demographic variables and contextual 
variables on whites’ opinion toward immigration policy.  They conclude that racial context has a 
significant effect on whites’ immigration attitude formation, since whites living in areas with large 
Hispanic and Asian populations are likely to have positive evaluations of these minority groups.  In 
their analysis of contextual effects, Stein, Post, and Rinden (2000) reach the same conclusion.  
Nonetheless, Hood and Morris find the opposite in California, a state with sizable and increasing 
populations of Latinos and Asians.  Surprisingly, Hood and Morris find that whites living in California 
are more likely to have a negative outlook toward Asians and Hispanics.  They hypothesize that living 
in a state with large and ever-increasing populations of Latinos and Asians, yet not having close 
proximity to these groups, causes one to view these groups negatively, perhaps even as threats. 
 
 Hood and Morris (1998) also explore the contact hypothesis further by investigating the impact of 
documented and undocumented migrant context on whites’ opinions towards immigration throughout 
the United States.  In conjunction with the contact hypothesis, Hood and Morris observe that as the 
documented migrant population grows whites’ discontent with legal immigration decreases.  On the 
other hand, they find that as the undocumented migrant population increases, whites’ discontent with 
undocumented immigration rises.  They attempt to explain these findings by claiming that “the 
development of positive inter-group attitudes via contact is contingent upon the existence of 
significant, long-term, high-quality interaction” (Hood and Morris 1998: 11).  In general, 
undocumented migrants cannot truly integrate themselves into a non-migrant social community and 
have long-term interaction with Americans without having certain privileged items members of social 




 Moreover, Hood and Morris (1998) assert that another rationale for the difference that documented 
and undocumented contexts have on immigration opinion is the environment in which inter-group 
interaction occurs.  When negative and intense opposition exists, the effects of inter-group contact are 
impeded.  For example, in a state like California, which has adopted strong opposing views towards 
undocumented immigration, positive inter-group perceptions are unlikely to result in a positive and 
welcoming environment for undocumented migrants.     
 
 Hood and Morris (2000) concentrate their attention on whites’ attitudes toward immigration 
policies, especially regarding California’s Proposition 187.  This initiative was designed to bar 
undocumented migrants from receiving access to state-level social service programs, health care 
services (except in an emergency) and public education (Hood and Morris, 2000: 194).  Using data 
from the state of California, the scholars also compare the contact hypothesis with the inter-group 
conflict theory, which affirms that inter-group contact strengthens conflict between groups.  Inter-
group contact theory is grounded on racial proximity resulting in perceptions of threat, which then 
bring about social conflict (Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995: 403).   
 
 Hood and Morris (2000) make several interesting observations.  The scholars conclude that Asian 
context has a significant and positive effect on whites’ vote choice.  Thus, the larger the size of the 
Asian population, the less likely whites are to support Proposition 187 and perceive immigration 
negatively.  On the other hand, Hood and Morris find that Hispanic context has a negative, yet 
insignificant, effect on Anglo vote choice on Proposition 187.  As a result, Hood and Morris affirm that 
the contact hypothesis offers a constructive explanation for the way that Anglos vote on Proposition 
187.          
 
2.2 Economic Self Interest 
 
 Economic self-interest theory helps explain why U.S. citizens differ in opinion regarding 
immigration to the United States (Fetzer 2000).  Fetzer defines economic self-interest as a strong fear 
of becoming poor or unemployed and suffering caused by decreasing finances or having a low salary 
and prestige employment.  Fetzer reasons that, since low-skilled immigrants allegedly have a negative 
impact on American blue collar workers by depressing wages and creating job displacement, these 
American workers are disproportionately likely to oppose immigration. 
 
 Burns and Gimpel (2000) use nationwide data from 1992 and 1996 to examine the influence that 
diverse ethnic groups’ economic circumstances and stereotypes have as explanations for attitudes 
toward immigration policy. They concentrate their study of economics and its influence on attitudes 
towards immigration on individuals’ attitudes of the national economy and discover that it has a very 
consistent impact on negative stereotyping.  Thus, those who are pessimistic about the national 
economy are likely to place blame on African Americans and Hispanics.  In addition, those who are 
optimistic are likely to credit whites.  Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) seemingly would agree with 
Burns and Gimpel to a certain extent. Their work reinforces the idea that those who believe that the 
U.S. economy is worsening have more negative attitudes towards immigration and immigrants than 









2.3 Symbolic Politics 
 
 Symbolic politics theories suggest that political attitudes and behavior are a function of broader, 
core attitudes (such as ideology and partisanship) that are developed through the socialization process. 
Some scholars have speculated that these core attitudes have an effect on individuals’ views toward 
immigrants and relevant policies. 
 
 Hood and Morris examine the role that political ideology and party identification play in 
influencing attitudes towards immigration. In their initial national search for causes of whites’ attitudes 
towards immigration, Hood and Morris (1997) find that whites who identify themselves as liberals are 
unlikely to favor restrictive levels of legal immigration.  Moreover, Hood and Morris (1998) analyze 
results of a survey conducted nationwide and come to similar conclusions, as in their first study.  
Individuals with strong conservative standpoints are more likely to be suspicious (and thus more 
restrictive) of legal immigration than those with liberal viewpoints.  Hood and Morris (2000) also 
come to the same conclusion when exploring the determinants of whites’ attitudes towards Proposition 
187.  They find that Republicans and conservatives are significantly more likely to favor Proposition 
187 than Democrats and liberals.   
 
 Similar to Hood and Morris (1997, 1998, 2000), Burns and Gimpel (2000) analyze national data to 
determine Americans’ attitudes towards immigration.  Unlike Hood and Morris’s findings, Burns and 
Gimpel conclude that conservatives have more positive views towards Hispanics than liberals.  They 
affirm that conservatives view Latinos in a more positive light than liberals because Hispanics may be 
perceived as more hardworking and family-oriented than African Americans.   
 
2.4 Demographic Characteristics 
 
 Scholars have also found that demographic attributes have an effect on the immigration attitudes of 
Americans (Hood and Morris, 1997; Hood and Morris, 1998; Hood and Morris, 2000; Binder et. al, 
1997). The theoretical bases for these effects are undoubtedly reflected in other theoretical processes 
already noted in the literature. For instance, African Americans’ views toward immigration are likely 
to reflect either economic self interest—i.e., as blacks compete with Latino and Asian immigrants for 
jobs, they are less likely to support immigration—or symbolic politics attitudes associated with the 
civil rights of minorities. 
 
 The effects of several demographic characteristics on immigration attitudes have been explored in 
the literature. First, age has been found to have a significant effect on whites’ attitudes towards 
Proposition 187 (Hood and Morris, 2000).  The scholars conclude that as age increases, respondents 
are more likely to favor Proposition 187.  Likewise, Binder et. al (1997) find that age has a negative 
effect on immigration support in Texas; they find that older respondents exhibit greater support for 
restrictive immigration policies.  Consequently, it appears that there is a generational effect in support 
for liberalized immigration.   
 
 Gender has also been found to have a significant influence on whites’ attitudes towards 
immigration.  Specifically, Hood and Morris (1997) find that females are less likely to favor restrictive 
immigration policies than are males.  It is worth noting that this finding stands in contrast to work on 
Latinos’ attitudes toward immigration by Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2006), who find that Latina 




 Socioeconomic status also matters.  Regarding income, Binder et. al (1997) conclude that both 
whites and Mexican Americans with high incomes are more likely to favor strict immigration policies. 
In terms of education, numerous scholars find that education levels significantly influence attitudes 
towards immigration (Hood and Morris, 1998; Hood and Morris, 2000; Binder et. al, 1997; Burns and 
Gimpel, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006).  For instance, Hood and Morris (1998) find that as 
respondents’ education level increases, they are more likely to favor a liberalized immigration policy.  
Likewise, Hood and Morris (2000) also conclude that those who are highly educated are less likely to 
vote in favor of strict immigration policies (such as Proposition 187) than those with little or no 
education.   
 
2.5 The Media 
 
 Besides the variables mentioned prior, the media should also have an effect on immigration public 
opinion.  Although very little research has been conducted on the media’s effect on immigration 
attitudes in the US, it is critical to examine the numerous works that explore and stress the importance 
of the media’s effect on public opinion.   
 
 One of the primary and prominent works in the literature of media and public opinion is News That 
Matters by Iyengar and Kinder (1978).   The scholars primarily explore the role that agenda-setting 
and priming have on individuals’ political attitudes and the role that priming and presidential character 
and responsibility shape public opinion.  The scholars find that the length of time a television network 
spends covering a story, the way that a story is presented and the selection of a network’s news stories 
strongly influence Americans’ political attitudes.  Iyengar and Kinder also conclude that individuals 
who are affected by a certain problem are more likely to accept their problem as a serious one, thus 
being predisposed to the influence of the media.  Furthermore, although the politically involved are 
more likely to watch the news, they may not be more likely to be persuaded by the coverage.  
Nevertheless, the scholars find that the more one voluntarily watches television news, the more he or 
she becomes more receptive to what it says. 
 
 A more contemporary work that examines the media’s effect on public opinion is by Entman 
(1989).  Unlike Iyengar and Kinder (1978), Entman explores how the media shapes public opinion 
through information processing.  He finds that the media has an effect on what people think, but more 
specifically by affecting what individuals think about.  The media influences public opinion by 
providing information regarding what people think about and by shaping how they think about it.  In 
addition, the scholar argues that attitudes toward unfamiliar issues are more susceptible to the 
influence of the media than familiar issues.   
 
 On the other hand, Mutz (1994) explores whether the media hampers or facilitates the translation of 
personal experiences into political preferences.  She argues that the media assists one in thinking about 
his/her own experiences when bringing up an issue.  Based on the experiences that one had and the 
feelings that he/she attributed to the experiences, one’s political attitudes are formed.  More 
specifically, Mutz finds that exposure to unemployment news is positively related to the impact of 
people’s personal experiences on presidential performance.  Furthermore, increasing exposure to 
unemployment news results in increasing the extent to which national employment perceptions are 






 In sum, the scholarly literature points to a number of possible issues that shape Americans’ 
attitudes toward immigration.  Some scholars argue that economic self-interest is key to shaping 
attitudes towards immigration, while others suggest that demographic attributes, symbolic politics, 
contact and context play significant roles in shaping immigration attitudes.  Some conclude that 
attitudes towards Latino and Asian immigrants compare, while others find that Americans view Latino 
and Asian immigrants differently. There appears to be some validity to the influence that these factors 
have on public opinion, yet additional research is needed to truly explore how Americans regard Latino 
and Asian illegal and legal immigration, the media’s effect on immigration attitudes and to determine 











































CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
 In this section, I lay out the general contours of my model of Americans’ attitudes towards illegal 
and legal immigration.  I consider the effects of several sets of independent variables: (1) symbolic 
politics variables, such as partisanship and ideology; (2) economic self-interest, including variables 
that reflect respondents’ perceptions of economic stress and possible threat from immigrants; (3) 
demographic attributes, including gender, age, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status; (4) 
attitudes toward Hispanics and Asians, two groups widely associated with current and past 
immigration; (5) media effects including television and print media (6) Americanism and values, 
representing individuals’ core attitudes about the American political system and possible effects of 
immigration on the American way of life; (7) religion effects, including Catholic and Protestant; and 
lastly (8) contextual variables, including levels of and changes in the Hispanic population, Asian 
population, and unemployment rate in the respondents’ home state.  The theoretical rationale for 
including these variables in the model is found below. 
 
 The data used in this study comes from the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES).  This 
study surveyed a nationally representative random sample of 1,212 individuals 18 years or older by the 
2004 election day.  The survey was conducted immediately prior to and after the 2004 presidential 
election.  There is a wide variety of academic and commercial surveys that include survey items 
relating to immigration, and in some cases there is a broader set of questions about the specifics of 
immigration. On the other hand, the ANES has a rich set of independent variables relevant to a study 
of Americans’ attitudes toward immigration, and many of these variables are not found in other 
surveys.  Due to the complexity of this research topic, survey research is one of the most appropriate 
forms of collecting observations for my study since I am able to collect an extensive number of 
Americans’ immigration opinions with detail.   
 
 A summary of the variables used in this study can be found in the Appendix. 
 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
 
As a starting point, I discuss the various ways that I measure attitudes towards immigration.  My 
main strategy is to incorporate four specific dependent variables into my analysis, and I use a principal 
components factor analysis to combine these four variables into a single scale.   
 
 The first dependent variable is support for (legal) immigration. This variable is based on the 
following question:  
 
 Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the 
United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, 
decreased a little, or decreased a lot? 
 
 Some surveys include items that explicitly ask respondents about their support for legal and/or 
illegal immigration. As we will see, the ANES includes items that deal explicitly with illegal 
immigration, but none that explicitly mention legal immigration. However, while the word “legal” is 
not included in the text of this question, the reference to “immigrants from foreign countries who are 
permitted to come to the United States” (my emphasis) implies, I believe, some level of legal status. 
Consequently, this variable can serve as a measure of general attitudes towards legal immigration to 
the U.S.  This variable is coded as a five-point scale, ranging from -2 for those who think that 
immigration should decrease a lot to +2 for those with the strongest level of support for increased 
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immigration.  As can be seen in Table 1, this variable is heavily skewed in the anti-immigration 
direction.  Approximately 47% of respondents support decreasing (legal) immigration, compared to 
only 10% who support increases in immigration.  The model category (43%) is for “keep the same.”  It 
would appear that Americans are generally tilted in the anti-immigration direction.   
 
 As stated prior, the 2004 ANES provides several ways to measure attitudes towards illegal 
immigration, and I incorporate three more dependent variables to accurately depict immigration public 
opinion.  For my second dependent variable, I use a survey item that reflects Americans’ support for 
spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration.  This variable is measured based on the 
following question: 
 
 What about tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration?  Should federal spending on 
tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept the 
same? 
 
 I use attitudes toward spending on border security as a measure of immigration attitudes. I suggest 
that support for a specific policy, such as spending on border security, can accurately represent 
attitudes toward immigration, especially illegal immigration in this case.   Recently, discussions and 
protests regarding illegal immigration and enforcing stringent US/Mexico border security have erupted 
throughout the US, and more individuals are associating immigration with border security.  This 
variable is measured as a three-point scale, coded +1 for respondents who prefer increased spending on 
border security to prevent illegal immigration, 0 for those who prefer to keep spending levels about the 
same, and -1 for those who support decreased spending on border security.  
  
 From Table 1, one can see that the vast majority (65%) of Americans support increases in spending 
on border security to prevent illegal immigration; here again, there seems to be a fairly strong 
sentiment against illegal immigration reported by ANES respondents.   
 
 For my third dependent variable I use the ANES measure of support for controlling illegal 
immigration as a foreign policy goal.  This variable is based on the following item: 
 
 Should controlling and reducing illegal immigration be a very important foreign policy goal, a 
somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all? 
 
Unlike the spending scale on border security, this item measures how important individuals feel 
about the priority that should be given to illegal immigration.  This variable ranges from 0 to 2, where 
0 represents controlling immigration is not important at all, 1 signifies controlling immigration is 
somewhat important, and 2 represents respondents for whom controlling immigration is very 
important.  A majority of respondents (58%) see controlling illegal immigration as “very important,” 
and an additional 37% see this goal as “somewhat important.”   
 
Fourth, attitudes toward illegal immigration are measured through a feeling thermometer for illegal 
immigrants.  Exploring individuals’ affect towards illegal immigrants taps into a more specific 
dimension of attitudes towards immigration particularly concerning the legality of those who 
immigrate to the US.  This variable may directly capture individuals’ public opinion or provide a new 
perspective on measuring attitudes toward illegal immigration compared to the other dependent 
variables listed above.  The feeling thermometer scale ranges from 0 (very negative feelings toward 
illegal immigrants) to 100 (very positive feelings towards illegal immigrants).  The mean feeling 
thermometer score for ANES respondents is only 41, suggesting that most Americans view 
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undocumented immigrants unfavorably.  Fully 74% of respondents categorize undocumented 
immigrants in either negative or neutral terms.   
 




                   %     N 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
   
Support for increased immigration 
 
  Decrease a lot           19.8%   207 
  Decrease a little          27.1%   284 
  Keep the same           43.0%   450 
  Increase a little            7.6%    79 
  Increase a lot             2.6%    27 
 
  Mean      -0.54 
  Standard deviation   0.98 
    
Feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants 
 
  0 – 25              23.2%   241 
  26 – 50             51.0%   530 
  51 – 75             18.0%   187 
  76 – 100               7.8%    81 
 
  Mean      41.33 
  Standard deviation  24.11 
 
Spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration 
 
  Decrease               6.4%     77 
  Keep the same            28.3%   339 
  Increase             65.2%   780 
 
  Mean      0.59 
  Standard deviation  0.61 
 
Foreign policy goal: control illegal immigration 
 
  Not important at all            5.1%    54 
  Somewhat important          36.8%   392 
  Very important           58.1%   618 
 
  Mean      2.53 




 Finally, I combined these four items into a single scale through the use of principal components 
factor analysis, the results of which are reported in Table 2.  These four variables are highly correlated 
with one another, and all four load on to a single dimension. Using the factor score from this analysis, I 
rescale the variable in the pro-immigration direction and hence denote it the “pro-immigration” scale 
(eigenvalue = 2.129, variance explained = 53%). This scale will be the primary dependent variable in 
my empirical analysis. In Figure 1, I overlay the histogram and kernel density plot for this variable. As 
one can readily observe, this variable is skewed to the left, meaning that most respondents fall on the 
“anti-immigration” side of the scale. Hence, this variable is balanced somewhat in the anti-immigration 
direction, though the large group in the middle of the distribution suggests that there are many 
moderates on this issue. 
 
 I find it noteworthy that attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration are so closely related to one 
another, to the point that a single dimension defines these attitudes. Some political commentators make 
a distinction between attitudes toward legal immigration and attitudes toward illegal immigration. The 
idea is that there are many Americans who are not opposed to legal immigration (or at least a 
discussion about appropriate levels of legal immigration) but who are strongly opposed to illegal 
immigration.  My findings suggest that how Americans rank themselves on legal and illegal 
immigration are strongly related, suggesting that attitudes toward immigration are structured along a 
single dimension. A similar pattern is observed in attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration among 
Latinos (Rouse et al. 2006).  
 
Table 2. Principal component factor results for immigration items 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 




 Eigenvalue:    2.129 




                  Factor           Scoring  
Variable           Loading  Uniqueness  Coefficients 
 
Support for increased immigration    -0.670   0.551   -0.315 
Feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants  -0.749   0.439   -0.352 
Spending on border security       0.702   0.508    0.330 
Foreign policy goal: control illegal immigration  0.792   0.373    0.372 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.2 Independent variables: Symbolic Politics  
 
 As noted, symbolic politics attitudes, particularly partisan identification and political ideology, 
shape Americans’ immigration attitudes (Hood and Morris 1997, 1998, 2000; Burn and Gimpel 2000).  
These core attitudes are developed through the socialization process and influence the development of 
other, more peripheral attitudes. Given this, I suggest that attitudes toward immigration are shaped by 
partisanship and ideology.  
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 In order to measure partisan identification, I utilize the standard seven-point scale, ranging from 0 
(strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican).  I hypothesize that partisanship will be negatively related 
to immigration attitudes, with Republicans less supportive of immigration than Democrats. Regarding 
political ideology, I also rely on a seven-point scale measure with a range from 0 (strong liberal) to 6 
(strong conservative).  I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be negative, suggesting 
that conservatives are less supportive of expended immigration than liberals. As noted prior, Hood et 
al. (1997, 1998, 2000) and Burns et al. (2000) disagree on whether partisan identification and political 
ideology have a positive or negative effect on immigration attitudes. However, most conventional 
discussions of the immigration issue suggest that Republicans and conservatives are more supportive 
of immigration restrictions, so I hypothesize a negative effect of partisan identification and political 

















Mean         0 
Standard deviation   1 
Median     -0.17 
 
Figure 1. Histogram for distribution of respondents on pro-immigration scale. 
 
Note: The pro-immigration scale is based on a principal components factor analysis of four items: (1) 
support for increases in immigration; (2) feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants; (3) support for 
spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal 






3.3 Independent Variables: Economic Self Interest 
 
My second set of independent variables represents self interest, mostly economic self interest.  
Much of the debate about immigration—especially illegal immigration—deals with the question of 
whether immigrants take jobs from American citizens and/or provide low-wage labor that keeps wages 
for American citizens below what they otherwise would be. Moreover, many immigrants send at least 
some of their earnings back to family in their home countries, and this means a lower macro-economic 
benefit for local communities than would be realized if wages were being distributed to U.S. citizens. 
In the past decade, there has been a major influx of immigrants to the U.S., and there is widespread 
speculation that immigrants fill jobs at low wages that could be taken by American citizens at higher 
wages. This line of argument has been used in discussing conflict between Latinos and African 
Americans. Many black Americans contend that Latinos depress wages and fill jobs that African 
Americans could fill, and this translates into concern by black Americans about their job prospects. 
That this would influence the attitudes of the economically vulnerable, especially African Americans, 
is not surprising (Gay 2006). Of course, the counterargument, commonly cited by those who are 
supportive of free immigration, is that immigrants take unpleasant, low-wage jobs that American 
citizens would not be willing to take. The implication of this argument is that immigrants play a vital 
role in the U.S. economy by performing necessary jobs, and further that immigrants are not taking jobs 
away from any Americans. 
 
I include several measures of economic self interest, including personal economic evaluations, 
national unemployment evaluations, labor union participation, unemployment status, household 
income and occupation.  First, I consider the effect of respondents’ retrospective personal economic 
evaluation, which represents individuals’ perceptions of their own economic well-being over the past 
year. This variable is measured using a five-point scale, ranging from 0 (much worse) to 4 (much 
better). I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable is positive, suggesting that individuals who 
have positive (negative) evaluations of their personal economic condition are more (less) likely to 
support unrestricted immigration.   
 
 My second measure of economic self interest is the retrospective national unemployment 
evaluation variable.  This variable reflects individuals’ perceptions of the national unemployment rate 
in the past year. I measure this variable using a five-point scale, again ranging -1 (worsened) to 0 
(stayed the same) to 1 (improved).  I speculate that individuals who perceive that the national 
unemployment rate has worsened or increased will be more likely to be threatened by immigrants and 
hence be more supportive of immigration restrictions; thus, I hypothesize that the coefficient for this 
variable will be positive.     
 
 Participation in a labor union may also tap into individuals’ economic self interest and affect 
immigration public opinion.  Individuals join labor unions to obtain protection of labor and wage 
rights; thus, those who are affiliated with labor unions may have established firm attitudes toward 
immigration and immigrants, whom they may perceive as economic threats.  Consequently, my third 
measure of economic self interest is participation in a labor union in one’s household.  This variable is 
measured on a scale from 0 (no one in the household participates in a labor union) to 1 (at least one 
person in the household participates in a labor union).  Due to my speculation that individuals 
associated with a labor union perceive immigrants as economic threats, I suggest that if at least one 
person in the respondent’s household belongs to a labor union, the respondent is more likely to favor 




 A fourth measure of economic self interest that I use in my model is respondents’ unemployment 
status. I create a binary variable, coded 1 for unemployed respondents and 0 otherwise. I suggest that 
those who are unemployed will be more likely to perceive an economic threat from expanded 
immigration and hence will be less likely to support unrestricted immigration.   
 
 My fifth measure of economic self interest is household income.  Typically, household income falls 
into the demographic attribute category and is not considered a measure of economic self interest.  
However, this variable can tap into individuals’ economic self interest, since an individual may 
consider his/her financial status when exploring his/her attitudes toward immigration.  As previously 
stated, Binder et al. (1997) argues that income has a positive relationship with Americans’ attitudes 
towards immigration, while Morris (2000) finds that income negatively shapes African Americans’ 
immigration public opinion.  I suspect that this variable positively affects immigration attitudes.  Thus, 
the higher one’s income, the less likely that one may perceive expanded immigration as an economic 
threat and, hence, be more supportive of relaxed immigration.  In order to measure the effect that 
household income has on support for immigration, I create a 23-point scale ranging from 1 (for less 
than $2,999) to 23 ($120,000 and over).   
 
 My last measure of economic self interest is occupation, specifically Latino occupation.  Due to 
my speculation that individuals who uphold employments similar to those of Latino immigrants may 
perceive the immigrants as economic threats and labor competition, I hypothesize that Americans who 
hold positions associated with Latinos may be less likely to favor expanded immigration.  This variable 
is coded 1 for those who hold positions associated with Latinos and 0 otherwise.  The following 
profession and industries are associated with “Latino occupations”: crop production, construction, food 
manufacturing, textile manufacturing, footwear manufacturing, landscaping, child care and home 
health care services, food services, automotive services, and laundry services.  This list has been 
formed from common knowledge of positions frequently filled by Latino immigrants and by the Pew 
Hispanic Center’s 2004 Latino Labor Report by Rakesh Kochhar.   
 
3.4 Independent Variables: Demographic Characteristics  
 
 In my model, I also consider the possibility that demographic attributes significantly influence 
Americans’ attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, I suggest that gender, age, education level, 
race and ethnicity, and having native-born parents shape Americans’ immigration attitudes.   
 
 First, I explore the effects of gender on attitudes toward immigration.  I measure gender as a simple 
binary variable, coded 1 for women and 0 for men. Women generally hold more liberal attitudes than 
do men, so I suggest that women are more likely to favor immigration than men.   
Second, I measure respondents’ age, ranging from 18 to 90 years. Based on previous arguments by 
Binder et al (1997) and Hood et al. (2000), I expect the coefficient for this variable to be negative, 
indicating that older individuals will be less likely to favor relaxed immigration.   
  
 Third, the effect of education on immigration attitudes has drawn some scholarly attention, 
especially from Hood and Morris (1998, 2000) and Ha and Oliver (2006).  I measure this variable on a 
scale from 1 (respondent has completed 8 grades or less and no diploma) to 7 (respondent has earned 
an advanced college degree).  In conjunction with Hood et al.’s (1998) “education as liberalizing” 
argument, I hypothesize that as Americans’ education level increases, they are more likely to favor 




 I also consider the effects of race and ethnicity. Arguably, some racial and ethnic groups are 
directly and indirectly affected by immigration. Asians and Latinos are likely to have been immigrants 
or the children of recent immigrants, and many will have family members and friends who are 
immigrants. Moreover, African Americans may be pulled in different directions. On one hand, African 
Americans may be threatened by the influx of immigrants because of the economic consequences; on 
the other, African Americans may be sensitive to the civil rights issues associated with immigration 
and hence may be more supportive of relaxed immigration. In order to capture these effects, I include 
separate dichotomous variables for Latinos, Asians, and African Americans; each variable is coded 1 
for respondents who are members of the relevant group, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Finally, in addition to the typical demographic attributes described above, I consider the effect of 
having parents born in the United States.  I create a binary variable, coded 1 for respondents with both 
parents born in the U.S., and 0 for all other respondents.  I hypothesize that the coefficient for this 
variable will be negative, suggesting that individuals with both parents born in the U.S. will be less 
supportive of expanded immigration than others. My reasoning is simple. Individuals with one or both 
parents born outside of the United States have been direct or indirect beneficiaries of immigration 
policies, and these individuals are also likely to have family and friends who are either immigrants 
themselves or who would like to immigrate to the United States.   
 
3.5 Independent Variables: Feelings toward Hispanics and Asians 
 
 One set of variables that has drawn relatively little attention in the literature on immigration relates 
to attitudes toward groups that are usually associated with immigration—i.e., in this case, Hispanics 
and Asians. Arguably, individuals could develop attitudes toward immigration that are based on their 
affect toward and perceptions of the individuals whom they see as part of the immigrant population. Of 
course, the United States has in its pool of immigrants people from every country in the world, yet 
much of the discussion of immigrant populations among political elites and in the news media revolves 
around Hispanics and Asians. I speculate that individuals who have favorable views toward Latinos 
and Asians will be more predisposed to support relaxed immigration, while those whose views toward 
Hispanics and Asians are negative will be reticent in their support for greater immigration.   
 
 I use four indicators of attitudes about Hispanics and Asians, two for each group. First, I include in 
my model a Hispanics feeling thermometer and an Asians feeling thermometer; these variables are 
coded on a scale from 0 (highly unfavorable) to 100 (highly favorable). If individuals base their 
attitudes toward immigration, at least in part, on their affect toward Hispanics and Asians, I would 
expect the coefficients for these two variables to be positive.  I hypothesize that individuals who view 
Hispanics and Asians in favorable terms will be more supportive of liberalized immigration; 
conversely, those who hold unfavorable attitudes toward Hispanics and Asians are expected to be less 
favorably disposed to immigration.   
 
 In addition, the ANES includes a series of items that relate to respondents’ perceptions of the 
attributes of four racial and ethnic groups—i.e., whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The traits that 
are evaluated are hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy, and each racial and ethnic group is 
evaluated by each respondent on a seven-point scale, coded so that the high score indicates that the 
group has that trait. I combined the three trait variables for Hispanics to create a single scale, denoted 
trait perceptions for Hispanics, that reflects the degree to which respondents perceive Hispanics as 
having these three positive attributes.  I also created a similar variable for Asians, denoted trait 
perceptions for Asians, which represents respondents’ perceptions that Asians have these positive 
attributes. If individuals consider their evaluations of Hispanics and/or Asians in shaping their attitudes 
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toward immigration, I hypothesize that the coefficient for each of these trait variables will be positive. 
Americans who perceive Hispanics and/or Asians in negative terms should be less likely to support 
relaxed immigration.   
 
3.6 Independent Variables: Media (Television, print and radio) 
 
 “The media make a significant contribution to what people think-to their political preferences and 
evaluations-precisely by affecting what they think about” (Entman, 1989: 347).  Although very little or 
no research has been specifically conducted on the media’s effect on immigration attitudes among 
Americans, many scholars such as Entman (1989), Barker and Knight (2000), Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (1998), Mutz (1994) and Jordan (1993) emphasize the importance of the media’s emotional and 
thought-processing effects on public opinion.   
  
 Thus, I include three measures of the media’s effect on immigration public opinion in my model.  
My first measure of the media’s effect on immigration attitudes is the level of attention an individual 
grants to national network television news.  Iyengar and Kinder (1978) have provided extensive 
support that television news greatly shapes people’s attitudes toward policies and the importance that 
they attribute to certain policies.  Consequently, I suspect that the more individuals watch national 
network television news, the more their immigration attitudes will be influenced by the television 
news.  However, the television media generally portrays immigrants and immigration in a negative 
tone instigating perceptions of immigrants as economic threats amongst its viewers; thus, I suspect that 
the more individuals watch national network television news, the less likely that they will favor relaxed 
immigration.  Frequency of watching national network television news is measured on a scale from 0 
to 7, 0 representing watching national networks news zero days a week (no attention) to 7 representing 
watching national network news seven days a week.   
 
 A second measure of the media’s effect is the number of days an individual watches early and late 
local television news.  Although this variable compares to the one above by measuring the effect of 
television news on public opinion, the topics and tone of the television news broadcasts differ from the 
national network news broadcasts.  Early and late local television news broadcasts take a more casual, 
informal tone and are more brief and concise in their newscasts in comparison to national broadcasts.  
Nonetheless, similar to national news, I hypothesize that early and late local news broadcasts portray 
immigration with a negative tone prompting fear and anxiety among its viewers.  Consequently, I 
suspect that this variable has a significantly negative relationship with favorable attitudes toward 
immigration.  The frequency of watching early local news and late local news are two separate 
variables, originally coded 0 to 7 (indicating the number of days an individual watches early and late 
local news). These variables will be combined to form a single variable coded from 0 (not watch early 
and late local news) to 14 (watch both early and late local news seven days a week).    
      
 My third measure of the media’s effect on immigration attitudes is the number of days an 
individual reads newspaper news.  Including newspaper news into my model provides a broader 
examination of the effect that television as well as print media has on Americans’ immigration public 
opinion.  Similar to television news, newspaper news plays a significant role in shaping public opinion 
and policy preferences (Jordan 1993).  I speculate that print media portrays immigration more often in 
a negative tone than in a positive one.  Thus, I hypothesize that the more frequently one reads the 
newspaper, the less likely he/she will express favorable immigration attitudes.  I code the frequency of 
reading newspaper news on a scale ranging from 0 (not read newspaper news at all) to 7 (read 




 Talk radio shapes public opinion (Barker and Knight 2000). More specifically, these scholars find 
that talk radio host Rush Limbaugh’s negative messages caused significant changes in people’s 
attitudes toward salient issues from 1994 to 1996.  Although I have found no research exploring the 
effects of talk radio on immigration attitudes, I suspect that talk radio shapes immigration public 
opinion.  Similar to the hypotheses listed above, I speculate that talk radio is more likely to portray 
immigration negatively than positively.  Consequently, I hypothesize that Americans who listen to talk 
radio are more likely to favor expanded immigration than those who do not listen to talk radio.  This 
variable is coded as a binary variable, 0 representing not listening to talk radio to 1 representing 
listening to talk radio.     
 
 Besides the variables listed prior, I include an interaction independent variable measuring the effect 
of the frequency of conservatives and liberals watching national network news on the support for 
immigration.  This variable tells the change in effect of political ideology for the frequency of 
watching national network news.  I hypothesize that conservatives’ immigration public opinion is more 
likely to be influenced by watching national network news than liberals’ immigration attitudes.  I pose 
this hypothesis, since as mentioned prior, I speculate that the national network news presents expanded 
immigration in a more negative tone than a positive one and conservatives are less likely to favor 
immigration than liberals.  Thus, when conservatives watch national network news broadcasts on 
immigration, their unfavorable immigration attitudes are reinforced and increase.        
 
3.7 Independent Variables: Americanism and Values Scales 
 
 The issue of immigration activates a wide range of core attitudes that help define how American 
citizens think about their country and its culture and language. For some Americans, immigration 
represents a threat to their sense of love-of-country, patriotism, and the important national symbols 
such as the flag, Mom, and apple pie. These Americans will support immigration only insofar as they 
see immigrants assimilating themselves into American culture and developing the same love-of-
country and support for American symbols that they have. For these Americans, support for 
immigration drops considerably to the extent that they perceive immigrants as failing to immerse 
themselves into American culture or as being disrespectful to American culture, language, and 
symbols. For instance, one need only observe the reaction that many Americans had to the immigration 
protests held in March and April 2006--particularly when protest participants waved flags from their 
home countries—to see how powerful adherence to these symbols and images can be in the 
immigration debate. For other Americans, immigration represents a challenge to traditional 
sensibilities relating to social order, work ethic, morality, and the protection of American economic 
interests. Insofar as some Americans view immigrants as violating these common tenets of American 
culture or challenging the economic prospects of Americans, there is a tendency to oppose expanded 
immigration.  
 
 On the other hand, some Americans hold values and core attitudes that are likely to promote 
support for immigration. For some Americans, immigration is tied to efforts to open the American 
political and economic system to individuals from other countries, many of whom face poverty, 
inequality, and/or oppression. From this perspective, immigration is a major component of efforts to 
share the American dream with the less fortunate. Simply, immigration has the effect of creating 
greater global equality and protecting the human rights of the downtrodden.  
 
 I hope to capture these two perspectives with a series of independent variables that are designed to 
reflect the values that Americans see challenged and supported by immigration. First, I suggest that 
individuals who have a strong sense of patriotism, love of country, and adherence to American 
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symbols will be less supportive of immigration, yet more supportive of border security.  In order to 
capture these effects, I plan on creating a pro-Americanism scale using five items from the ANES: (1) 
When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat 
good, or not very good?  (2) There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of 
America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree?  (3) There are some things about 
America today that make me feel angry about America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or 
disagree?  (4) How strong is your love for your country—extremely strong, very strong, somewhat 
strong, or not very strong?  (5) Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat 
important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally?  I hypothesize that this scale is 
negatively related to support for relaxed immigration. 
 
 Second, I plan on creating a moral traditionalism scale based on the following four items, all of 
which will be coded on five-point scales ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree): (1) 
the world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; (2) 
the newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society; (3) we should be more tolerant of 
people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from 
our own; and (4) this country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional 
family ties.  I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable is negative, indicating that individuals 
who score in the direction of moral traditionalism are less likely to support relaxed immigration than 
other individuals.   
 
 Third, I suggest that many individuals see immigration as a civil rights or equality issue.  I 
speculate that those who have strong concerns with equality will be more supportive of relaxed 
immigration than individuals who do not share those concerns.  I plan on creating a pro-equality scale 
based on individuals’ responses to six items, each one of which will be coded on a five-point scale 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree: (1) Our society should do whatever is necessary to 
make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed; (2)we have gone too far in pushing equal 
rights in this country; (3) one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an 
equal chance; (4) this country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are; (5) it 
is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others; and (6) if 
people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. 
 
 Fourth, I include in my model two variables that represent the foreign policy goals of individual 
respondents. The ANES includes an item to assess the degree to which respondents view human rights 
as an important foreign policy goal; this variable is coded from 0 (not an important foreign policy 
goal) to 2 (a very important foreign policy goal). I suggest that many individuals view immigration as a 
human rights issue, and individuals for whom this is an important issue are expected to be more 
supportive of relaxed immigration than other citizens. Hence, I hypothesize that the coefficient for this 
variable will be positive.    
 
 Moreover, a similar item is included in the ANES survey to reflect the importance given by 
respondents to “protecting jobs of American workers.” This variable, denoting protecting jobs as a 
foreign policy goal, is also coded on a three point scale, with a high score representing respondents 
who view protecting jobs as a very important foreign policy goal. Since immigration may be seen by 
many Americans as threatening the jobs of fellow Americans, I hypothesize that the coefficient for this 






3.8 Independent Variables: Religion Effects 
 
 The effect of religion on immigration public opinion is a topic that has very little or no attention in 
the immigration public opinion literature.  Thus, I am intrigued to determine if affinity to a Protestant 
faith versus the Roman Catholic faith results in a difference in support for immigration.  These two 
religions differ on the precedent that many Protestant religions place a significant emphasis on 
evangelization, building a sense of community amongst its followers, and supporting strong, liberal 
social and political policies.  However, the Roman Catholic Church is not prominent for its emphasis 
on evangelization, community building and supporting liberal social and political policies as other 
Protestant religions.  Thus, I hypothesize that individuals who belong to Protestant religions are more 
likely to favor expanded immigration than Roman Catholics.  Being Protestant has a positive effect on 
support for immigration, yet being Catholic has the opposite effect. I create a binary variable for each 
religious group and code 1 for Protestant/Catholic and 0 otherwise.        
 
3.9 Independent Variables: Context 
 
 Finally, I include several contextual variables in my model.  I suggest that individuals do not live in 
a vacuum, but rather they exist in a context that carries with it information that is relevant to 
immigration. The racial and ethnic attributes of individuals’ contexts, along with information about the 
state of the economy, can have an effect on how individuals think about immigration. 
 
 First, I consider the effects of the state Hispanic population percentage in 2004, the year of the 
survey. Based on the findings of Hood and Morris (1997), as the Latino state population increases, 
whites are more likely to have favorable attitudes towards immigration.  Presumably, as individuals 
have more contact with Latinos, their views toward Latinos become more favorable, and this translates 
into attitudes that are more favorable toward relaxed immigration. I hypothesize that the coefficient for 
this variable will be positive.   
 
 On the other hand, change in Hispanic population may have a negative effect on immigration 
attitudes. Hood and Morris (1997) conclude that in the state of California (a state with a significant 
immigrant population), as the Latino immigrant population grows, Anglos are less likely to favor 
immigration.  Similarly, Morris (2000) argues that as the Latino population increases, blacks are less 
likely to favor immigration.  I suggest that rapid increases in the Hispanic population may challenge 
Americans’ ability to adjust to associated changes in culture, language, and economics. Given this, I 
hypothesize that short-term change in Hispanic population (measured from 2000 to 2004) will have a 
negative effect on attitudes toward immigration.  However, I suspect that a long-term change in 
Hispanic population will have a positive effect on immigration attitudes.   
 
 I have similar expectations for the Asian population. Like Latinos, Asians are a racial group often 
associated with immigration, and hence their presence in individuals’ contexts should shape their 
attitudes toward immigration. The findings from previous research have been a bit mixed. Hood and 
Morris (1997) find that, as the Asian population increases, whites are more likely to favor immigration. 
Similarly, Morris (2000) finds that as the Asian population grows, blacks are more likely to favor 
immigration.  On the other hand, Hood and Morris (1997) conclude that in the heavily immigrant 
populated state of California, the Asian population has a negative effect on attitudes towards 
immigration.  Since I am making speculations regarding Americans’ immigration attitudes nationwide, 
I hypothesize that the state Asian population percentage in 2004 will be positively related to pro-
immigration attitudes, but that change in the Asian population (from 2000 to 2004) will be negatively 
related to support for relaxed immigration.   
 20 
 
 Lastly, I also consider the effects of the level of and changes in unemployment. Individuals who 
reside in states with high unemployment rates should be particularly sensitive to immigration, since for 
many Americans, immigrants play a threatening role in economic well-being.  I include state 
unemployment rate (in 2004) and change in state unemployment rate (from 2000 to 2004) as 
independent variables in my model.  I hypothesize that the coefficients for both independent variables 
will be negative, indicating that respondents living in states with high unemployment rates or large 













































CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Americans’ General Support for Immigration 
 
 In Table 3, I estimate a regression model for Americans’ general support for immigration.  The 
coefficients for this model are divided into eight broad categories of independent variables that affect 
Americans’ attitudes toward immigration: (1) symbolic politics attitudes; (2) economic self interest; (3) 
demographic attributes; (4) feelings toward Hispanics and Asians; (5) media effects; (6) Americanism 
and value scales; (7) religion effects; and (8) contextual variables.  At the outset, it is important to note 
that this model does a pretty good job in portraying Americans’ perceptions of immigration.  The 
adjusted R squared for the model is 0.369, and variables from all of the categories of independent 
variables are found to have significant effects on general support for immigration.   
 
 Turning first to the symbolic politics variables, I find that the variables in this category do not have 
strong significant effects on the dependent variable.  Partisan identification is unrelated to attitudes 
toward immigration; the coefficient for this variable is in the unexpected negative direction and fails to 
achieve statistical significance. On the other hand, the coefficient for ideological orientation suggests 
that this variable has a negative effect on Americans’ immigration attitudes, but the coefficient is only 
at the borderline of statistical significance. Overall, even with the most relaxed interpretation, these 
two symbolic politics variables do not make an important contribution to respondents’ immigration 
attitudes.  
 
 Much the same can be said regarding economic self interest variables. I am struck by the 
observation that only one of the variables in this category has a significant effect on Americans’ 
attitudes toward immigration. The conventional wisdom is that Americans’ attitudes toward 
immigration are shaped by concerns about the economic effects of immigration. However, contrary to 
what a large portion of the literature on immigration attitudes suggests, I can assert that Americans’ 
personal economic situation, the national unemployment rate, labor union participation, unemployment 
status and holding an occupation associated with Latinos do not significantly shape Americans’ 
general support for immigration.  A possible explanation for these findings is that since the majority of 
the respondents in this study are white, whites may perceive immigrants more as cultural threats than 
as economic threats.  A more in-depth explanation for this will be provided in the discussion regarding 
Americanism and value scales’ effect on support for immigration.     
  
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that Americans’ household income has a significantly positive 
effect on immigration attitudes (b = 0.011, t = 1.73).  Thus, the higher Americans’ income, the more 
likely they are to favor immigration.  A possible explanation for this finding is that those with higher 
income perceive immigrants as less of an economic threat than those who obtain lower incomes; thus, I 
conclude that wealthy individuals are more receptive to immigration than individuals in the middle and 
lower classes.   
  
 In terms of demographic attributes, I find that gender, education, being Black, being Hispanic, 
being Asian, and having parents born in the U.S. have discernible effects on Americans’ immigration 
attitudes.  In accordance with the majority of research on immigration attitudes, I find that women are 
significantly more likely than men to support relaxed immigration.  Also, education has a liberalizing 
effect on immigration attitudes; those with high levels of education are significantly more likely to 





Table 3. OLS regression estimates for model of Americans’ general support for immigration  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                   b        t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Constant             -0.678   -1.54* 
 
Symbolic Politics Attitudes 
 Party identification [-]         0.005    0.22  
 Ideological orientation [-]        -0.056   -1.37* 
 
Economic Self-Interest 
 Retrospective Personal Economic Situation [+]   0.005    0.16 
 Retrospective National Unemployment rate [-]   0.066    1.46 
 Household participation in labor union [-]      -0.052       -0.62 
 Unemployment status [-]        -0.076       -0.39 
 Household income [+]         0.011        1.73** 
 Latino Occupation [-]                                                  0.076             0.94 
 
Demographic attributes 
 Gender [+]              0.112    1.74** 
 Age [-]              -0.002   -0.64 
 Education [+]             0.052    2.27** 
 Black [+/-]             0.272    2.49** 
 Hispanic [+]            0.347    2.37*** 
 Asian [+]              0.038               0.16 
 Parents born in the US [-]        -0.174   -1.77** 
   
Feelings toward Hispanics and Asians 
 Hispanics feeling thermometer [+]     0.001    0.61 
 Asians feeling thermometer [+]      0.005    2.07** 
 Trait perceptions of Hispanics [+]     0.081    5.11*** 
 Trait perceptions of Asians [+]         -0.028   -1.91* 
  
Media Effects 
 Frequency of watching national network news [-]   -0.027   -0.87 
 Frequency of watching local network news [-]     -0.007   -0.81 
 Frequency of reading newspaper news [-]      -0.008   -0.66 
 Frequency of listening to talk radio [-]       -0.111   -1.75** 
 Interaction of watching national 
 network news and political ideology [+]    0.006    0.71 
  
Americanism and Value Scales 
 Pro-American scale [-]            -0.205   -5.94*** 
 Pro-equality scale [+]          0.051    1.42* 
 Moral traditionalism scale [-]       -0.245   -6.29*** 
 Foreign policy goal: human rights [+]     0.279    5.56*** 
 Foreign policy goal: protect jobs [-]     -0.394   -5.22*** 
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Table 3. Continued 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 




 Catholic [-]            0.221    2.73***    
 Protestant [+]                 0.123               1.59* 
 
Contextual Variables 
 Hispanic Population (2004) [+]      0.023     2.30**    
 Asian population (2004) [+]              -0.029               -0.97      
 Unemployment Rate (2004) [-]      0.016         0.36  
 Change in Hispanic Population [-]         -0.234              -1.70**   
 Change in Asian Population [-]      0.019                  0.07 
 Change in Unemployment Rate [-]         -0.079                -0.63    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N       707 
Adjusted R2    0.369    
 
Note: Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient. 
 
***prob < .01 ** prob < .05 * prob < .10 
 
 
 Furthermore, the coefficient for Hispanic status is positive and significant (b = 0.347,  
t = 2.37), indicating that those who identify themselves as Hispanic are substantially more likely 
support to immigration than non-Hispanics.  This finding makes sense since the majority of 
immigrants in the U.S. are Latinos, but I am surprised to find that the coefficient for Asian status is not 
similarly significant.  Lastly, in accordance with my expectations, those whose parents were born in 
the U.S. are less supportive of immigration than individuals whose parents are foreign-born. 
 
 With regard to the variables representing respondents’ feelings toward Hispanics and Asians, I find 
only mixed support for my hypotheses. Of the two feeling thermometer items, only the Asian 
thermometer has the expected effect on immigration attitudes.  As expected, feeling thermometer 
evaluations of Asians are positively related to attitudes about immigration; individuals who like Asians 
are more likely to support relaxed immigration than other individuals. On the other hand, the 
coefficient for Hispanic feeling thermometer scores is positive, yet it fails to achieve conventional 
levels of statistical significance.  
 
 The variable in this cluster that has a striking relationship with the dependent variable is trait 
perceptions of Hispanics.  Americans’ perceptions of Hispanics as hardworking, intelligent, and 
trustworthy has a strong, significant effect on Americans’ general support for immigration (b = 0.081, t 
= 5.11).  It would appear that Americans associate Hispanics with immigration, since their perception 
that Hispanics have three positive traits is positively associated with their support for immigration.  
However, contrary to expectations, the relationship between trait perceptions of Asians and support for 
immigration is negative, suggesting that Americans who have positive perceptions of Asians as 
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hardworking, intelligent and trustworthy are actually less likely to support immigration. Clearly, 
Americans see Asians in a different light than Latinos, though an explanation for this difference awaits 
further research.  
 
With regards to the media’s effects on immigration attitudes, I find that Americans are not 
influenced greatly by the media when developing their immigration public opinion.  Table 1 indicates 
that television (local and national network news) and print media have no effect.  Furthermore, I 
examine the effect that the interaction variable has on support for immigration.  To restate, I 
hypothesize that the effect of watching national network news on support for immigration varies for 
liberals and conservatives.  In this model, the interaction coefficient does not have a significant effect 
on immigration attitudes.  Thus, a critical difference between conservatives and liberals in support for 
immigration based on watching national network news does not exist.  On the other hand, the only 
form of media that has a significant effect on support for immigration is talk radio.  In conjunction 
with my hypothesis, Americans who listen to talk radio are more likely to develop more restrictive 
immigration attitudes than those who do not listen to talk radio.   
  
 Besides media effects, I also consider the influence of Americanism and values on Americans’ 
support for immigration and find that these independent variables have perhaps the strongest effect on 
Americans’ general support for immigration.  I find that the pro-American scale (b = -0.205, t = -5.94), 
moral traditionalism scale (b = -0.245, t = -6.29), support for human rights as a foreign policy goal (b = 
0.279, t = 5.56) and support for protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal (b = -0.394, t = -5.22) are 
strongly related to the dependent variable. These effects are all in the expected direction. My findings 
suggest that those who strongly identify with Americanism, who support maintaining traditional 
morals, and who are strong supporters of protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal are less supportive of 
immigration. Also as predicted, those who support human rights as a foreign policy goal are 
significantly more likely to favor immigration.  Unlike the other value scales, the coefficient for the 
pro-equality scale suggests that there is a small link between support for equality and immigration 
public opinion; those who support equality are slightly more likely to support immigration.  Due to the 
highly significant effects that the variables in this category have on the dependent variable, I suspect 
that Americans are inclined to perceive immigrants as cultural threats (threats to the “American” 
culture), at least more than economic threats as mentioned prior.   
 
 In terms of religion effects, being Catholic and being Protestant have significant effects on 
Americans’ general support for immigration.  Unlike what I hypothesized, being Catholic has a highly 
significant positive effect on immigration support (b = 0.221, t = 2.73).  As a result, Catholics are more 
likely to support immigration than non-Catholics.  The reasoning for this finding requires further 
explanation.  However, as predicted, being Protestant also has a significantly positive effect on 
individuals’ support for immigration, but not to such a large extent as for Catholics.      
 
 Finally, I consider the effects of contextual variables. For the three contextual variables 
representing the current Hispanic population, Asian population, and unemployment rate, the results are 
somewhat mixed. For Americans who live in states with large Hispanic populations, there is a strong 
positive effect on immigration attitudes.  This finding is wholly consistent with the contact theory.  It 
suggests that as Americans have more contact with Hispanics, they develop more favorable views 
toward Hispanics, and this is translated into greater support for immigration since Hispanics are the 
largest immigrant group.  
 
 However, my findings suggest that the contact theory does not apply to the Asian population.  The 
negative coefficient for this variable suggests that as the number of Asians increase, Americans 
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become less supportive of immigration.  One interpretation is that this finding is in accordance with the 
inter-minority conflict theory, which suggests that as the number of Asians increase, the less likely are 
Americans to have a favorable view toward Asians. However, I find little evidence of animus toward 
Asians as their population increases.2 One alternative interpretation—to be explored in future 
research—is that many Americans view Asians as a “model” immigration group, and Americans may 
be willing to express strong anti-immigration sentiments even as they hold favorable views toward the 
traits that Asian Americans are perceived to hold.  
 
 Consequently, I suggest that changes in context may have an effect on immigration attitudes, and 
my findings are somewhat consistent with this notion. I find that increases in the Hispanic population 
are associated with significant declines in support for immigration. The coefficient for the change in 
Hispanic population coincides with my predictions.  Controlling for the effects of other variables, I 
find that Americans who reside in states with the largest increases in the Hispanic population are 
systematically less supportive of immigration than those residing in states with only small changes in 
Hispanic population.  On the other hand, it is also important to note that changes in the Asian 
population and the unemployment rate do not have a significant effect on Americans’ immigration 
attitudes.  Although Asians are a large immigrant group in the U.S., they may not be identified as 
immigrants in the same way as Hispanics.  More research is necessary to explore this phenomenon.  
Similarly, although being surrounded by Hispanics may shape immigration attitudes, being surrounded 
by unemployment and a change in the unemployment rate may not significantly influence Americans’ 
support for immigration.     
 
4.2 Structural Equation Modeling: Pathway Analysis Model Development 
 
 In order to further understand the factors that shape Americans’ immigration attitudes, I employ 
structural equation modeling (SEM), specifically pathway analysis, to test the linkages 
among the 2004 ANES variables in Table 3.  SEM includes several regression equations which are 
fitted simultaneously using maximum likelihood as the model estimator.3   
 
 The conceptual model from my path analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.  In this figure, the variables 
that may have an effect on support for immigration are divided into “core” and “peripheral” categories.  
The variables at the top of the figure are part of the core category.  This category represents variables 
that are fixed, those that are not likely to alter.  They include: political ideology, party identification, 
being Catholic, frequency of watching national network news, being Protestant, household income, 
unemployment status, being Hispanic, being Asian, having parents in the US, the percentage of 
Hispanics in one’s state and the percentage of Asians in one’s state.  On the other hand, peripheral 
variables (listed in the middle of the figure) are those that may be shaped by core factors and are those 
that may directly affect support for immigration.  These variables include: viewing human rights as a 
foreign policy, moral traditionalism values, viewing protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal, the 




                                                 
2 This is actually not supported by the data. In an auxiliary analysis (results not shown), I find that the 
   size of the Asian population is unrelated to feeling thermometer scores for Asians. 
 
3 Maximum likelihood is the standard method of estimating free parameters in structural equation modeling (Hoyle and Panter 





 The conceptual model in Figure 2 examines the causal connections between core and peripheral 
variables.  I expect that political ideology and partisan identification affect support for human rights as 
a foreign policy goal since support for human rights can often be associated with political beliefs as 
well as values.  For example, liberals and Democrats may be more likely to support human rights as a 
foreign policy goal in comparison to conservatives and Republicans since many of liberals’ and 
Democrats’ beliefs and values place a strong emphasis on maintaining fairness, equality and justice for 
all.  Furthermore, maintaining fairness and justice for all play key roles in upholding human rights 
(Ely-Yamin, 1993).  
  
 Another causal connection in this model can be found between religion and moral traditionalism 
values.  Being Catholic or Protestant may also affect one’s emphasis on traditional family ties and 
upholding moral behavior, components of the moral traditionalism value scale.  Since adhering to a 
certain religion may influence one to place more emphasis on upholding moral behavior compared to 
being non-religious, I argue that being Catholic or Protestant has an effect on support for moral 
traditionalism.  Besides religion, watching national network news should also shape Americans’ 
support for moral behavior.  Several scholars such as Baum (2002) and Hunt (1997) have found 
intriguing relationships between the media and support for morals.   
  
 Household income and unemployment status influence support for protection of jobs as a foreign 
policy goal since income and unemployment status measure individuals’ economic self interest, as 
noted prior.  Protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal can also be a measure of economic self interest 
since those who support protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal may be concerned about their 
financial and/or employment situation.   
 
However, although household income, unemployment status and protection of jobs as a foreign policy 
goal are measures of economic self interest, household income and unemployment status are core 
variables that do not change and influence whether an individual favors protection of jobs.  Those who 
have a low household income and are unemployed may be more likely than the wealthy and employed 
to favor protection of jobs abroad.   
 
 Several factors shape the Hispanic feeling thermometer, which then affects support for 
immigration.  Being Hispanic should have a significant relationship with the Hispanic feeling 
thermometer since I strongly suspect that being Hispanic has a considerable effect on how one feels 
about members of his/her race.  Furthermore, being surrounded by Latinos in one’s state should 
influence how Americans feel about Hispanics since the individuals who are surrounded by Hispanics 
are able to see and learn directly about Latinos, thus, influencing his/her feelings about them.  Lastly, 
having parents born in the US should shape Americans’ feelings toward immigrants.   Individuals 
whose parents are immigrants are very likely to be influenced to view immigrants favorably, including 
Latinos, since they are the largest immigrant group in the US.       
 
 The last set of core/peripheral relationships involves the Asian feeling thermometer and being 
Asian and the Asian population.  Being Asian should be strongly related to the Asian feeling 
thermometer since I speculate that being Asian has a great influence on how one feels about members 
of his/her race.  Furthermore, being surrounded by Asians in one’s state should also affect how he/she 
feels about Asians since Americans are able to see and learn directly about Asians and, thus, form their 
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Americans’ General Support for Immigration 
  
 Figure 2 also illustrates connections between peripheral variables and support for immigration.  
These peripheral variables are included in this path model since they have highly significant 
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relationships with support for immigration, as shown by the regression coefficients in Table 3, except 
the Hispanic feeling thermometer.  This variable is included in the path model, nevertheless, since 
feelings towards the largest group of U.S. immigrants are very applicable to my study.   
 
4.2.2 Political Ideology Pathway Model 
 
 Besides examining relationships among core and peripheral variables, the main focus of my use of 
path analysis in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 is to explore the direct and indirect effects of political 
ideology on support for immigration.  Thus, the indirect effects of political ideology on the dependent 
variable will be portrayed through the direct effects of political ideology with all of the peripheral 
variables mentioned in Figure 2.  However, it is important to mention that in order to examine the 
indirect and direct effects of political ideology on support for immigration, I am controlling for the 
effects of all the variables in Figure 2.  In order to do this, I examine relationships between each core 
variable to each peripheral variable, each core variable to the dependent variable and each peripheral 
variable to the dependent variable.   However, all of the relationships are not depicted (with arrows) in 
Figure 2 and 3 in order to maintain model clarity.  The relationships that interest me the most are 
illustrated in Figure 3.     
 
4.2.3 Theory and Methods for Political Ideology Pathway Model 
 
 Figure 3 explores political ideology’s direct and indirect effects on support for immigration.  I have 
chosen to focus my path analysis on political ideology since it plays a prominent, interesting and 
central role in shaping immigration public opinion (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade et. al 1996; 
Hood et. al 1997; Hood et. al 1998; Hood et. al 2000; Wilkinson, Rouse, Nguyen and Garand 2007). 
 
 Besides political ideology, the regression estimates in Table 3 indicate that human rights as a 
foreign policy goal significantly shape immigration attitudes, a much more significant relationship than 
political ideology’s effect on the dependent variable.  As mentioned prior, political ideology and 
support for human rights are related based on the idea that many liberals are more likely than 
conservatives to base their values and beliefs in maintaining equality, fairness and justice amongst all 
individuals of society.  Furthermore, upholding human rights is often associated with maintaining 
fairness and justice amongst all.  Consequently, I suspect that political ideology has a negative effect 
on support for human rights, indicating that conservatives are less likely to support human rights as a 
foreign policy goal compared to liberals.   
 
 I also hypothesize that political ideology influences support for moral traditionalism values.  
Components of the moral traditionalism value scale can be strongly associated with political ideology.  
Embracing family ties and supporting the idea that modern lifestyles result in society’s destruction and 
support for family ties can be linked to a conservative political ideology since conservatives may be 
more likely to value tradition than liberals and be less embracive in supporting individualism and 
maintaining equality and fairness among all when faced with social developments such as newer 
lifestyles (Smith 1990).  Consequently, I argue that political ideology has a positive effect on support 
for moral traditionalism values.  The more conservative one is, the more likely that he/she supports 
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*** prob < .01 ** prob < .05  * prob < .10 
 




  In addition to being linked to human rights and moral traditionalism values, political ideology 
can affect economic issues such as support for protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal.  Smith 
(1990) finds that political ideology is related to material concerns and government regulations; 
however, his findings do not make a clear argument that government intervention in economic 
concerns is a conservative/liberal issue more than a liberal/conservative issue.  Consequently, I do not 
propose directional hypotheses between political ideology and supporting protection of jobs as a 
foreign policy goal.       
 
 Political ideology can also shape feelings toward Hispanics and feelings toward Asians.  Smith 
(1990) finds that liberals are more likely than conservatives to support equal rights especially regarding 
race/ethnicity and civil liberties.  Furthermore, liberals are more likely to push for state intervention 
than conservatives.  “Trends favoring state intervention were… to protect equal rights, especially of 
“powerless” groups (minorities or the working class)” (494).  Hence, I speculate that political ideology 
has a negative relationship with Hispanic and Asian feeling thermometers, indicating that 
conservatives are less likely to have positive feelings toward Hispanics and Asians than liberals.   
       
 In addition, I hypothesize that the peripheral variables have strong effects on support for 
immigration based on the reasoning presented in the prior methods section and since Table 3 portrays 
their significant effects on the dependent variable.  Supporting human rights as a foreign policy goal 
and feelings toward Asians should have positive effects on support for immigration.  On the other 
hand, support for protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal and support for moral traditionalism values 
should negatively and significantly affect support for immigration.  The only peripheral variable from 
Figure 2 that does not significantly influence the dependent variable in Table 3 is the Hispanic feeling 
thermometer.  Thus, I provide no directional hypothesis regarding this variable’s relationship with the 
dependent variable.  Nonetheless, as mentioned prior, the Hispanic feeling thermometer is included in 
the political ideology path model since feelings towards the largest group of U.S. immigrants are very 
applicable to my study.   
 
 As mentioned prior, I also explore political ideology’s direct effect on support for immigration. 
Based on the reasoning presented in the earlier method section and the results on Table 3, I suspect that 
political ideology has significantly negative effect on the dependent variable.  Thus, I hypothesize that 
conservatives are less likely to favor expanded immigration than liberals.     
 
4.2.4 Empirical Results 
 
 In Table 4, I estimate the political ideology path analysis model found in Figure 3.  The only core 
variable in this model is political ideology, yet the following peripheral variables are included: human 
rights as a foreign policy goal, moral traditionalism, protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal, the 
Hispanic feeling thermometer and the Asian feeling thermometer.        
 
 First, it is important to mention that my data and results generally support my hypotheses.  Political 
ideology has a large impact on support for human rights as a foreign policy goal.    As my statistical 
model indicates, political ideology negatively and significantly affects support for human rights as a 
foreign policy goal (path coefficient = -0.044).  I also observe the statistically significant impact of 
political ideology on moral traditionalism values (path coefficient = 0.308), further highlighting the 
relationship between conservatives and support for moral traditionalism.  More importantly, political 
ideology’s expected negative, direct relationship with support for immigration is further highlighted 
(path coefficient = -0.074).  This coefficient indicates that conservatives are very much against 
supporting immigration.   
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Table 4. Political Ideology Model Path Coefficients: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects (standard 
coefficients shown) 
 
   Direct Indirect Total 
Political 
Ideology 
 Foreign policy goal: 
human rights 
-0.044*** -0.015 -0.059 
Political 
Ideology 
 Moral Traditionalism  0.308*** -0.080  0.228 
Political 
Ideology 
 Foreign policy goal: 
protect jobs 
-0.006  0.002 -0.004 
Political 
Ideology 
 Hispanic feeling 
thermometer 
 0.261  0.003  0.264 
Political 
Ideology 
 Asian feeling 
thermometer 
 0.151  0  0.151 
Political 
Ideology 
 Support for 
Immigration 
-0.074***  0 -0.074 
      
Foreign policy  
goal: human 
rights 
 Support for 
Immigration 
 0.336***  0  0.336 
      
Moral 
Traditionalism 
 Support for 
Immigration 
-0.260***  0 -0.260 
 
 




 Support for 
Immigration  
-0.400***  0 -0.400 




 Support for 
Immigration 
 0.010***  0  0.010 
      
Asian Feeling 
Thermometer 
 Support for 
Immigration  
 0.001  0  0.001 
 
*** prob < .01 ** prob < .05  * prob < .10 
 
 Contrary to my expectations, however, political ideology does not significantly impact feelings 
toward Hispanics and feelings toward Asians.  A possible explanation for this finding is that feelings 
toward immigrants tap into feelings toward the act of immigration and the legality associated with this 
act.  Thus, liberals may not directly associate Hispanics and Asians with minorities or individuals who 
are helpless.   However, more research needs to be conducted to determine why this is so.  On the other 
hand, it is important to mention that the pathway between political ideology and support for protecting 
jobs as a foreign policy goal was insignificant, reinforcing the hypothesized ambiguity of this 




 When it comes to the peripheral variables’ effects on support for immigration, all but one of the 
variables listed in Figure 3 have significant effects on general support for immigration.  Supporting 
human rights as a foreign policy, moral traditionalism, and supporting protection of jobs as a foreign 
policy significantly shape the dependent variable in the hypothesized directions.  Contrary to my 
expectations, the Hispanic feeling thermometer has a significantly positive relationship with support 
for immigration, indicating that Americans’ positive feelings toward Hispanics results in favorable 
attitudes toward expanded immigration in the US.  Moreover, the Asian feeling thermometer does not 
have a significant effect on the dependent variable.  A possible explanation for this is that Americans 
do not view Hispanics in the same way that they view Asians.  Nevertheless, more research should be 
conducted to provide a better explanation for this finding.        
 
       In sum, conservatives have strong opposing attitudes toward immigration.  Conservatives are less 
likely than liberals to see human rights objectives as appropriate for foreign policy and people who 
support human rights as a foreign policy are more likely to be pro-immigration.  Conservatives are 
more likely than liberals to support moral traditionalism and people who support moral traditionalism 
are less likely to be pro-immigration.  Furthermore, individuals who favor protecting jobs as a foreign 
policy goal are less likely to favor expanded immigration.  However, Americans who have positive 
feelings toward Hispanics are more likely to be pro-immigration than those who do not exhibit positive 
feelings.   
 






















CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Past research has focused on the immigration public opinion of specific racial groups and 
overarching theories regarding the factors that shape individuals’ attitudes toward immigration.  
However, previous scholarly works on this topic have failed to provide a comprehensive model of 
immigration attitudes that can be applied to all racial groups and include a variety of categories of 
factors that shape public opinion.  Through the hypotheses posed in this paper, I expand on 
immigration public opinion research by exploring the determinants of Americans’ (whites, blacks, 
Hispanics and Asians) attitudes toward immigration.  I develop a measure of general support for 
immigration based on individuals’ responses to four immigration items: (1) support for increases in 
(legal) immigration; (2) feeling thermometer scores for illegal immigrants; (3) support for spending on 
border security to prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal immigration” as a 
foreign policy goal. These items load on a single factor and permit me to generate a global pro-
immigration scale that reflects Americans’ general views toward immigration.  Furthermore, I develop 
a comprehensive model of immigration attitudes that includes eight clusters of independent variables: 
(1) symbolic politics attitudes; (2) economic self-interest; (3) demographic attributes; (4) feelings 
toward Hispanics and Asians, which are two groups commonly associated with immigration; (5) media 
effects, including television, radio and print; (6) values, including Americanism, moral traditionalism, 
egalitarianism, and views about important foreign policy goals; (7) religion effects; and (8) state racial, 
ethnic, and economic context.  In addition, unlike any other research on immigration public opinion 
that I have come across, I employ structural equation modeling, specifically pathway analysis, to test 
the linkages among the factors that may shape public opinion and the pro-immigration scale.   
 
 My findings have important implications.  First, I am struck by how strongly my four immigration 
items load on a single dimension. To be sure, three of the four items are explicitly about illegal 
immigration, but the fourth item is arguably more relevant to legal immigration. The fact that items 
relating to legal and illegal immigration load so well on a single dimension is important. Many 
observers and commentators have made a clear-cut distinction between legal and illegal immigration, 
yet it appears that support for (and opposition to) legal and illegal immigration are strongly enough 
related that they reflect a single underlying immigration dimension.  
 
 Second, through the comprehensive model of immigration attitudes, I show that Americans’ 
attitudes toward immigration are strongly driven by demographic attributes, feelings toward Hispanics 
and Asians, Americanism and other relevant values and views regarding foreign policy goals.  
Surprisingly, economic self-interest plays almost no role in shaping immigration attitudes, despite its 
prominent place in contemporary debates about immigration in the United States.   In addition, I find 
the difference in coefficients for Latino and Asian variables to be potentially important targets of 
future research. To be sure, Latinos and Asians are not the same. Latinos have a much larger share of 
the U.S. population, and there has been a great deal of attention paid to the influx of Hispanics—
particularly from Mexico and Central and South American countries—and the rapid increase in the 
Hispanic population in the United States. But even given these differences, I am surprised to see the 
differences in the effects of Latino-related and Asian-related variables on attitudes toward 
immigration. Clearly, more research is needed to understand how Americans view these two groups in 
the immigration process. 
 
 Third and last, what does the future hold for immigration public opinion research?  The research 
program on immigration attitudes is a long one. In this paper, I explore the attitudes toward 
immigration in the general population.  Future research should be directed at more in-depth studies of 
immigration attitudes within various racial and ethnic groups.  I have already begun work with 
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research collaborators on immigration attitudes within the Latino population (Rouse et al., 2006), and 
this work is being expanded to encompass African-American and Asian populations.  Testing models 
of immigration attitudes among these various groups is more than an academic exercise.  To the 
contrary, exploring the determinants of immigration attitudes in white non-Hispanic, African 
American, Hispanic, and Asian populations gives us great leverage over the testing of general 
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APPENDIX: Description of Variables 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable          Description 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pro-Immigrant Scale      Scale of support for immigration, based on principle 
components factor analysis of four items: (1) support for 
increases in immigration; (2) feeling thermometer for illegal 
immigrants; (3) support for spending on border security to 
prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling 
illegal immigration” as a personal foreign policy goal. 
Eigenvalue = 2.129; variance explained = 0.532. 
 
Partisan Identification      Partisan identification scale, ranging from 0 (strong 
Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican).   
 
Ideological Orientation     Political ideology scale, ranging from 0 (strong liberal) to 6 
(strong conservative) 
 
Retrospective Personal  
Economic Situation       Scale of personal economic well-being over the past year, 
ranging from 0 (much worse) to 4 (much better). 
 
Retrospective National  
Unemployment Situation      Scale of national unemployment situation over 
                the past year, ranging -1 (worsened in past year) 
                                                                  to 0 (stayed the same) to 1 (improved in past 
                                                                  year) 
 
Participation in Labor Union in 
Household                  1 = at least one person in household participates 
                in labor union; 0 = otherwise 
  
Unemployed        1 = unemployed respondents; 0 = otherwise 
 
Household Income       Household income scale ranging from 1 (for less than $2,999) 
to 23 ($120,000 and over) 
 
Gender         1 = female respondents; 0 = male respondents 
 
Age          Age in years, range from 18 to 90 years 
 
Education          Educational attainment scale, ranging from 1 (respondent has 
completed 8 grades or less and no diploma) to 7 (respondent 
has earned an advanced college degree) 
 
Parents born in the U.S.      1 = both parents born in the United States;  0 = 





    
Variable          Description 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Latino Occupation      1 = Latino occupation (Crop production; 
                                                                  construction; fruit and vegetable preserving and 
                                                                  specialty food manufacturing; animal 
                                                                  slaughtering and processing; fiber, yarn, and 
                                                                  threat mills; fabric mills, except knitting; textile 
           and fabric finishing and coating mills; carpets 
                                                                  and rugs manufacturing; textile product mills 
                                                                  except carpets and rugs; knitting mills; cut and  
                                                                  sew apparel manufacturing; apparel accessories 
                                                                  and other apparel manufacturing; footwear 
                                                                  manufacturing; specialty food stores; 
           warehousing and storage; landscape services; 
                                                                  home health care services; child day care 
                                                                  services; restaurants and other food services; 
                                                                  automotive repair and maintenance; car washes; 
                                                                  drycleaning and laundry services); 0 = otherwise  
 
Hispanic         1 = Hispanic respondent; 0 = non-Hispanic 
                                                                   respondent 
 
Asian          1 = Asian respondent; 0 = non-Asian respondent 
 
African American       1 = African American respondent; 0 = non- 
                                                                  African American respondent 
 
Hispanics Feeling Thermometer   Feeling thermometer scale for Hispanics, ranging from 0 
(highly unfavorable) to 100 (highly favorable) 
 
Asians Feeling Thermometer     Feeling thermometer scale for Asians, ranging from 0 (highly 
unfavorable) to 100 (highly favorable) 
 
Trait Perceptions of Hispanics   Sum of three 7-point trait scales for Hispanics (i.e., 
hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy). Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.731.  
 
Trait Perceptions of Asians    Sum of three 7-point trait scales for Asians (i.e., hardworking, 
intelligent, and trustworthy). Cronbach’s alpha = 0.756. 
 
Frequency of watching  
national network television news   Scale of the number of days an individual 
                                                                  watches national network television news, 
                                                                  ranging from 0 (not watch) to 7 (watch national 





    
Variable          Description 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Frequency of watching  
early and late local news       Scale of the number of days an individual 
                                                                  watches early and late local television news, 
                                                                  ranging from 0 (not watch) to 7 (watch early 
                                                                  and late local news seven days a week) 
 
Frequency of reading  
newspaper news              Scale of the number of days an individual reads 
                                                                  the newspaper news, ranging from 0 (not read 
                                                                  newspaper at all) to 7 (read newspaper news 
                                                                  seven days a week) 
 
Talk radio         1 = listening to talk radio; 0 = not listening to 
                                                                   talk radio 
 
Pro-Americanism Scale     Scale of support for Americanism and patriotism, based on 
principle components factor analysis of five items: (1) When 
you see the American flag flying does it make you feel 
extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very 
good?  (2) There are some things about America today that 
make me feel ashamed of America. Do you agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, or disagree?  (3) There are some things 
about America today that make me feel angry about America. 
Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree?  (4) 
How strong is your love for your country—extremely strong, 
very strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong?  (5) Is 
being an American extremely important, very important, 
somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important 
to you personally?  Items #2 and #3 are negatively loaded on 
this factor. Eigenvalue = 2.129; variance explained = 0.532. 
 
Moral Traditionalism Scale    Scale of support for moral traditionalism, based on principle 
components factor analysis of four items: (1) the world is 
always changing and we should adjust our view of moral 
behavior to those changes; (2) the newer lifestyles are 
contributing to the breakdown of our society; (3) we should 
be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to 
their own moral standards, even if they are very different 
from our own; and (4) this country would have fewer 
problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family 







    
Variable          Description 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pro-equality Scale       Scale of support for equality principles, based on principle 
components factor analysis of six items: (1) Our society 
should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone 
has an equal opportunity to succeed; (2)we have gone too far 
in pushing equal rights in this country; (3) one of the big 
problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an 
equal chance; (4) this country would be better off if we 
worried less about how equal people are; (5) it is not really 
that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in 
life than others; and (6) if people were treated more equally in 
this country we would have many fewer problems. 
Eigenvalue = 2.508, variance explained = 0.418. 
 
Foreign policy goal: human rights  Scale representing degree to which respondent perceives 
human rights as an important foreign policy goal, ranging 
from 0 (not an important foreign policy goal) to 2 (a very 
important foreign policy goal).  
 
Foreign policy goal: protect jobs   Scale representing degree to which respondent perceives 
protecting jobs of American workers as an important foreign 
policy goal, ranging from 0 (not an important foreign policy 
goal) to 2 (a very important foreign policy goal). 
 
Catholic          1 = Roman Catholic; 0 = otherwise 
 
Protestant         1 = Protestant; 0 = otherwise 
 
Hispanic Population (2004)    State Hispanic population percentage, 2004 
 
Asian Population (2004)     State Asian population percentage, 2004 
 
Unemployment Rate (2004)    State unemployment rate, 2004 
 
Change in Hispanic Population   Change in Hispanic population percentage, 2000 
                                                                  to 2004. 
 
Change in Asian Population    Change in Asian population percentage, 
                                                                  2000 to 2004. 
 
Change in Unemployment Rate   Change in state unemployment rate, 2000 to 
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